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We extend the analysis in Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2005) to provide a compre-
hensive examination of the cross-sectional relationship between growth and macro-
economic volatility over the past four decades. We also document that while there
has generally been a negative relationship between volatility and growth during this
period, the nature of this relationship has been changing over time and across dif-
ferent country groups. In particular, we detect major shifts in this relationship after
trade and financial liberalizations. In addition, our results show that volatility
stemming from the main components of domestic demand is negatively associated
with economic growth. [JEL E32, F36, F43]
D
uring his distinguished tenure as the Economic Counselor of the IMF and
Director of its Research Department, Michael Mussa made many important
contributions to the literature on globalization and its implications for both indus-
trial and developing countries. Having been at the Fund during the trying periods
of the Asian and Russian crises, Mussa had a special appreciation for the chal-
lenges faced by emerging market economies in trying to balance the benefits and
risks of globalization. Many of his writings on this topic have focused on how
developing countries could attain the growth benefits of globalization while min-
imizing their susceptibility to financial and balance of payments crises.
Indeed, the broader issue of understanding the complex relationship between
macroeconomic volatility and economic growth has long been a challenge for econ-
omists. During the 1980s, it was generally accepted that the impact of volatility on
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economic growth and welfare was at most minor and that, therefore, volatility was
hardly anything to be feared.1 Research in the 1990s (for example, Ramey and
Ramey, 1995) reached a strikingly different conclusion—that macroeconomic
volatility may actually reduce long-term growth.2 This was an important result
since it implied that policies and economic shocks that increased volatility could
have significant longer-term negative effects on economic welfare by reducing
growth.
The causes and consequences of macroeconomic volatility have also received
renewed attention because of the financial crises experienced by a number of devel-
oping countries over the past two decades. Such crises are extreme manifestations of
volatility, but they have clearly highlighted its costs, including the consequences
of large episodes of volatility in terms of increases in inequality and poverty. Many
of these crises have been associated with the rapid opening-up of some developing
economies to global trade and financial linkages—a phenomenon broadly referred to
as globalization. While facing episodes of high-output volatility on account of these
crises, this group of developing economies, often referred to as “emerging markets,”
has also posted much better average growth rates during the period of globalization
than other developing economies.
The ongoing debate about the benefits and costs of globalization has prompted
a resurgence of interest in analyzing the relationship between volatility and growth,
particularly since the Ramey and Ramey (1995) results are based on a data set that
ends in 1985, just when the pace of trade and financial integration started to gain
momentum. Some recent papers show that the negative relationship between growth
and volatility persisted into the 1990s (for example, Fatás, 2002; Aizenman and
Pinto, 2005; and Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005). Other empirical studies focus on
how the relationship between growth and volatility is affected by a particular source
of volatility, including volatility stemming from fluctuations in government expen-
ditures and the terms of trade (see, for example, Mendoza, 1997; Turnovsky and
Chattopadhyay, 2002; and Fatás and Mihov, 2003). Recent research also considers
various channels linking macroeconomic volatility to long-term growth (for exam-
ple, Aizenman and Marion, 1999; and Martin and Rogers, 2000).
In Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2005), we analyze how the growth-volatility
relationship has been influenced by different aspects of globalization. Our main
result in that paper is that, while the growth-volatility relationship was preserved on
average in the 1990s, both trade and financial openness appear to attenuate this neg-
ative relationship. In other words, even though economies that are more integrated
into the global economy might be subject to more volatility, they do not necessarily
suffer lower growth than less integrated economies as a result of that additional
volatility.
1In addition, Lucas’s (1987) work suggested that the welfare costs associated with business-cycle fluc-
tuations were small, bringing into question the desirability of stabalization policies aimed at smoothing out
these fluctuations.
2Lucas’s finding about the direct adverse welfare effects of volatility has also been challenged since
then (see Pallage and Robe, 2003; and Barlevy, 2004). Recent empirical research also finds that volatility
has a significantly negative impact on poverty (Laursen and Mahajan, 2005).GROWTH AND VOLATILITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
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This paper extends the scope of our research program by analyzing the growth-
volatility relationship in several dimensions. First, we provide a more detailed
descriptive account of the evolution of the dynamics of growth and volatility over
time and across countries. We then analyze the role of globalization in this process
by employing an event-study analysis to examine how growth and volatility change
before and after trade and financial liberalizations. We also examine the implica-
tions of the negative relationship between volatility and growth in the context of a
regional case study on sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In addition, we analyze the empir-
ical importance of various components of aggregate output in influencing the rela-
tionship between volatility and growth.
To set the stage for this analysis, it is useful to begin with a characteriza-
tion of how pervasive the forces of globalization have been in recent decades. The
increase in international trade and financial linkages since 1985 has indeed been
quite remarkable. For example, between 1985 and 2000, the share of emerging
market countries in our data set that had liberalized their trade regimes increased
from 30 percent to almost 85 percent. The share of countries with open financial
accounts rose from 20 percent to about 55 percent over this period. Spurred by these
liberalizations, the volume of international trade has registered a dramatic increase,
with the ratio of world exports and imports to world GDP rising from 75 percent in
the mid-1980s to more than 150 percent by the end of the 1990s. Private capital flows
from industrialized to developing economies have also increased dramatically since
the mid-1980s, with the bulk of these flows going to emerging market economies.3
Why is it important to consider these dramatic changes in trade and financial
linkages in analyzing the relationship between growth and volatility? While both
trade and financial integration probably have their distinct roles in explaining the
changes in the dynamics of this relationship, financial integration, in particular, is
likely to have been an important factor influencing the relationship during the past
20 years, especially as increased international financial flows appear to have pre-
cipitated episodes of high volatility in many developing economies. This raises an
interesting question about whether the high growth rates in emerging markets that
are presumably fueled in part by international financial flows come at the cost of
higher volatility associated in part with the vagaries of these flows.
The change over time in the relative vulnerability of industrial and develop-
ing economies to external crises also raises questions about whether the growth-
volatility relationship is influenced by the “growing pains” seemingly associated
with rising trade and financial integration. To be more specific, are the level of a
country’s development and the extent of its integration into international markets
important in determining the conditional validity of this relationship? In this con-
text, while there appears to be a consensus that trade openness stimulates domestic
growth, it also seems to be the case that such openness increases an economy’s vul-
nerability to external shocks, including highly volatile terms-of-trade shocks. The
3See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001 and 2003) for a detailed analysis of the increase in global finan-
cial flows, including among industrial countries. The main increase in gross capital flows to developing
countries has been in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio flows, while the relative
importance of bank lending and other official flows has declined over time.M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones
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effects of financial integration are less obvious in theoretical and empirical studies.
And the theoretical literature is largely inconclusive on how trade and financial
integration, in addition to the factors discussed above, affect the growth-volatility
relationship. Amore detailed empirical analysis of this issue is therefore warranted.
I. What Do We Learn from Recent Theoretical 
and Empirical Studies?
Effects of Globalization on Growth
A number of theoretical models have been developed to analyze the importance
of trade and financial openness in promoting economic growth. Some of these
theoretical models focus on static gains, including the gains derived from com-
parative advantage considerations. Others consider knowledge spillovers and
changes in the growth dynamics of productivity and investment associated with
international trade (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992; and
Baldwin and Seghezza, 1998).4
There are various direct and indirect theoretical channels through which
increased financial flows can enhance growth. The direct channels include aug-
mentation of domestic savings, reduction in the cost of capital through better
global allocation of risk, development of the financial sector (Levine, 1996; and
Caprio and Honohan, 1999), and transfer of technological know-how. The main
indirect channels are associated with promotion of specialization (Kalemli-
Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha, 2003) and inducement for better economic policies
(Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2003).
There is a large empirical literature studying the role of openness to trade and
financial flows in economic growth. For example, using a variety of methods, sev-
eral researchers, including Sachs and Warner (1995), Frankel and Romer (1999),
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003), show that trade openness
helps promote economic growth. Rodriquez and Rodrik (2000) challenge the robust-
ness of some of these findings and argue that several of these studies suffer from
problems associated with model misspecification and with the use of openness mea-
sures that may capture other policy or institutional features.
In contrast to the literature on trade and growth, recent empirical research is
unable to establish a clear link between financial integration and economic growth.
Most empirical studies find that financial integration has no effect or at best a mod-
est effect on economic growth (see the survey by Prasad and others, 2003). Another
set of empirical studies suggests that the composition of capital flows determines the
effects of financial integration on economic growth (Reisen and Soto, 2001; and
Goldberg, 2004). In particular, these studies conclude that FDI flows tend to be pos-
itively associated with output growth in those countries that have a sufficient level
of human capital (Borenzstein, De Gregorio, and Lee, 1998) and well-developed
4Berg and Krueger (2003), Baldwin (2003), and Winters (2004) provide extensive surveys of the lit-
erature on trade and growth.GROWTH AND VOLATILITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
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domestic financial markets (Alfaro and others, 2004). Other studies focus on the
impact of equity market liberalization on the growth rates of output and invest-
ment, typically finding a positive effect (Henry, 2000; and Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad, 2001).
Effects of Globalization on Volatility
The theoretical impact of increased trade and financial flows on output volatility
depends on various factors, including the composition of these flows, patterns of
specialization, and the sources of shocks. For example, if trade openness results in
increased specialization of countries’ production structures (at the industry level)
and if industry-specific shocks are important in driving business cycles, it could lead
to an increase in output volatility. However, if rising trade flows are associated with
increased vertical specialization across countries, the volatility of output growth
could decline (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2003a).
In theory, financial integration could help lower the volatility of macroeconomic
fluctuations in capital-poor developing countries by providing access to capital
that could help them diversify their production base. Rising financial integration,
however, could also lead to increasing specialization of production based on com-
parative advantage considerations, thereby making economies more vulnerable to
industry-specific shocks (Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha, 2003).
There is little consensus in the literature about the empirical relationship between
the intensity of trade linkages and macroeconomic volatility. While some studies
find no significant relationship between an increased degree of trade interdepen-
dence and domestic macroeconomic volatility (Buch, Döpke, and Pierdzioch, 2002),
others find that an increase in the degree of trade openness leads to higher output
volatility, especially in developing countries (Karras and Song, 1996; Easterly, Islam,
and Stiglitz, 2001). Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003a) find that while trade open-
ness increases the volatility of output and consumption growth in emerging market
economies, it reduces the volatility of consumption growth relative to that of income
growth, implying that trade flows improve risk-sharing possibilities. They also doc-
ument that financial integration does not have a statistically significant impact on
the volatility of output growth. They find some evidence that financial integration
could actually increase the volatility of consumption growth relative to that of income
growth but argue that this relationship is a nonlinear one—rising financial inte-
gration is associated with rising relative volatility of consumption only up to a cer-
tain threshold.
The Relationship Between Growth and Volatility
Several papers in the stochastic dynamic business-cycle literature have typically
propounded the view that the distinction between trend and cycles is an artificial
one, since both growth and fluctuations are driven by the same set of shocks.
However, there is no clear implication that can be derived from these models about
the relationship between volatility and growth (Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti,
1999; and Jovanovic, 2004).M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones
36
Various theoretical channels that can lead to a negative relationship between
growth and volatility are discussed in the literature. For example, some theoretical
models argue that the link between growth and volatility depends on the dynamics
of investment (Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 1991; and Aizenman and Marion, 1993).
A few papers emphasize the importance of costs associated with learning (Martin
and Rogers, 2000; and Blackburn and Galindev, 2003), while others consider the
importance of terms-of-trade fluctuations (Mendoza, 1997). There are some theo-
retical studies arguing that macroeconomic volatility could have a beneficial impact
on economic growth (Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty, 1999; Aghion, Bacchetta, and
Banerjee, 2000; Blackburn, 1999; and Blackburn and Pelloni, 2004). Ranciere,
Tornell, and Westermann (2003) and Tornell, Westermann, and Martinez (2003)
find that credit market imperfections in financially open economies could lead to
increased volatility and higher growth.
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989) are among the
earliest papers to directly examine the growth-volatility relationship. These papers
report that the relationship is positive. On the other hand, in an influential contribu-
tion that has since acquired the status of conventional wisdom, Ramey and Ramey
(1995; henceforth referred to as RR) conclude that growth and volatility are neg-
atively related. Using a data set comprising 92 countries and covering the period
1950–85, they show that the relationship is robust after introducing various control
variables, including the share of investment in GDP, population growth, human cap-
ital, and initial GDP.
Recent papers include Martin and Rogers (2000), who find evidence similar to
that of RR. Fatás (2002) explores the effects of using different control variables
and different measures of volatility and concludes that the negative growth-volatility
relationship is robust.5 Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) study the growth-volatility
relationship using a sample of 79 developed and developing countries over the period
1960–2000. They confirm that the relationship is robustly negative when numerous
controls from the growth literature are incorporated into their regression framework.
Both Fatás (2002) and Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) also control for trade open-
ness in their regressions, but their results indicate that the trade openness variable
has no significant impact on the relationship between volatility and growth. None
of these studies has examined the effects of financial integration.
II. Understanding the Basic Stylized Facts 
About Growth and Volatility
This section first describes the data set used in the analysis. Next, it presents some
stylized facts about the evolution of growth and volatility over time and across dif-
ferent groups of countries. It then provides a brief descriptive analysis of the dynam-
ics of growth and volatility before and after financial and trade liberalizations.
5In a recent paper, Imbs (2002) attempts to reconcile the positive relationship between growth and
volatility at the sectoral level with the negative relationship at the country level. He notes that how this
relationship at the sectoral level translates into the relationship at the aggregate level depends on the degree
of synchronicity of fluctuations across sectors and on the relative importance of aggregate versus sector-
specific shocks.GROWTH AND VOLATILITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
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Data Set
We examine the relationship between growth and volatility using a large data set that
includes industrial as well as developing countries. While the basic data set we use
is the latest version of the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002),
we supplement that with data from various other sources, including databases main-
tained by the World Bank and IMF. Our data set comprises annual data over the
period 1960–2000 for a sample of 85 countries—21 industrial and 64 developing.
The group of industrial countries corresponds to a subsample of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies for which data used
in the empirical analysis are available. For the descriptive analysis in the next two
sections, we divide developing countries into two coarse groups—more financially
integrated (MFI) economies and less financially integrated (LFI) economies. There
are 23 MFI and 41 LFI economies in our sample. The former essentially constitute
the group of emerging markets and account for a substantial fraction of net capital
flows from industrial to developing countries in recent decades.
In our analysis, we use two measures of trade integration. The first is a binary
measure based on the dates of trade liberalization and is taken from Wacziarg and
Welch (2003), who extend the data set constructed by Sachs and Warner (1995).
This measure takes a value of one when a country’s trade regime is liberalized, and
a value of zero otherwise. The trade liberalization dates were based on a detailed
examination of country case studies of liberalization. The second measure of trade
integration is a continuous one used widely in the literature—the ratio of the sum
of imports and exports to GDP.
To measure the degree of financial integration, we again employ both a binary
and a continuous measure. Our binary measure takes a value of one when the equity
market is officially liberalized; otherwise, it takes a value of zero. Most of the dates
of official financial liberalization for individual countries are taken from Bekaert,
Harvey, and Lundblad (2002) and Kaminski and Schmukler (2002). Our second
financial integration measure—the ratio of gross capital flows to GDP—is analo-
gous to the trade openness ratio.6
Evolutions of Growth and Volatility
The first column of Table 1 presents, for different country groupings, the cross-
sectional medians of the level and volatility of the growth rates of output and its
main components over the past four decades. Volatility is measured by the standard
deviation of the growth rate of each variable. Over the full sample period, output
6A detailed description of the data set and sources is provided in Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2005).
Our binary indicators can be regarded as measures of de jure trade and financial integration, while the con-
tinuous measures capture de facto integration. The distinction is of particular importance in understanding
the effects of financial integration, since many economies that have maintained controls on capital account
transactions have found them ineffective in many circumstances, particularly in the context of episodes of
capital flight. Financial-flows data are available for some countries for only a shorter period. In our regres-
sions, we use cross-sectional data that are based on averages over shorter time spans for some countries.
For the sample of countries we study, the problem is mostly for the 1960s, when financial flows to devel-
oping countries were quite limited anyway.38
Table 1. Growth and Volatility: Descriptive Statistics
(Medians for each group of countries)
Full Sample Decade
1961–2000 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Output
Growth
Industrial countries 2.80 3.75 2.75 2.09 1.88
[0.24] [0.49] [0.38] [0.17] [0.26]
Developing countries 1.57 2.46 2.06 0.32 1.39
[0.21] [0.22] [0.40] [0.36] [0.38]
MFIs 2.61 3.06 2.80 1.76 2.45
[0.41] [0.53] [0.99] [1.18] [0.70]
LFIs 1.23 2.25 1.77 −0.27 0.83
[0.25] [0.36] [0.56] [0.36] [0.67]
Volatility
Industrial countries 2.59 2.18 2.78 2.12 1.79
[0.36] [0.27] [0.26] [0.22] [0.28]
Developing countries 4.90 4.62 4.83 3.89 3.39
[0.30] [0.46] [0.58] [0.24] [0.30]
MFIs 4.07 3.29 3.35 3.56 3.27
[0.42] [0.57] [0.43] [0.64] [0.51]
LFIs 5.38 4.82 6.40 4.05 3.39
[0.61] [0.56] [0.52] [0.31] [0.37]
Consumption
Growth
Industrial countries 2.71 3.33 3.02 2.44 1.82
[0.26] [0.62] [0.38] [0.40] [0.36]
Developing countries 1.26 1.93 2.00 0.25 1.48
[0.20] [0.37] [0.33] [0.42] [0.35]
MFIs 1.89 2.88 2.89 0.92 2.25
[0.52] [0.46] [0.70] [1.08] [0.53]
LFIs 0.82 1.15 1.63 −0.76 0.83
[0.19] [0.33] [0.28] [0.37] [0.54]
Volatility
Industrial countries 3.32 2.32 2.30 2.47 1.58
[0.62] [0.39] [0.25] [1.09] [0.71]
Developing countries 6.91 5.70 6.29 6.23 5.15
[0.43] [0.34] [0.51] [0.47] [0.48]
MFIs 5.63 5.13 5.54 4.70 4.73
[0.64] [0.56] [0.91] [0.67] [0.73]
LFIs 7.99 6.35 7.21 7.19 5.58
[0.66] [0.45] [0.92] [0.55] [0.64]
Investment
Growth
Industrial countries 2.78 5.00 1.49 2.67 2.10
[0.36] [1.14] [0.88] [0.38] [0.65]
Developing countries 2.03 4.61 4.06 −1.71 2.02
[0.36] [0.52] [1.13] [0.82] [0.94]
MFIs 2.68 4.63 4.55 1.71 2.64
[0.78] [0.99] [1.50] [1.35] [0.93]
LFIs 1.31 4.30 4.06 −3.00 2.02




1961–2000 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Volatility
Industrial countries 9.16 7.40 10.53 8.36 7.11
[0.90] [0.86] [1.29] [1.55] [0.72]
Developing countries 18.37 18.24 18.24 16.27 15.14
[1.27] [1.66] [1.38] [1.37] [1.10]
MFIs 15.76 14.48 11.32 13.27 14.18
[1.74] [3.00] [2.73] [3.26] [2.37]
LFIs 21.80 19.12 20.28 17.40 15.14
[1.42] [1.77] [1.62] [1.10] [1.24]
Exports
Growth
Industrial countries 5.27 7.07 4.96 4.33 5.60
[0.38] [0.92] [0.53] [0.28] [0.71]
Developing countries 2.55 2.77 3.23 2.23 3.47
[0.49] [0.54] [0.94] [0.66] [0.73]
MFIs 4.95 2.60 5.21 4.35 6.04
[1.03] [0.77] [1.01] [1.32] [1.39]
LFIs 1.82 3.25 2.20 1.11 1.94
[0.40] [1.16] [1.05] [0.99] [1.00]
Volatility
Industrial countries 4.67 3.95 5.26 3.51 3.89
[0.42] [0.84] [0.37] [0.54] [0.45]
Developing countries 11.85 9.88 12.23 10.08 7.73
[0.65] [0.93] [1.29] [0.70] [0.57]
MFIs 9.20 8.51 10.36 8.28 6.76
[1.09] [1.69] [1.52] [0.74] [0.75]
LFIs 13.71 11.56 14.79 10.84 9.02
[0.88] [1.21] [1.66] [1.70] [1.23]
Imports
Growth
Industrial countries 5.16 7.59 4.05 3.92 5.07
[0.40] [0.81] [0.61] [0.42] [0.40]
Developing countries 2.46 3.14 4.28 −0.58 3.41
[0.46] [0.56] [0.61] [0.97] [0.85]
MFIs 3.61 3.07 5.56 1.43 6.17
[0.85] [0.93] [1.08] [2.35] [1.07]
LFIs 1.82 3.14 3.74 −1.75 1.56
[0.54] [0.78] [1.04] [1.09] [1.02]
Volatility
Industrial countries 6.07 5.76 8.02 5.09 4.93
[0.56] [1.13] [0.77] [0.65] [0.35]
Developing countries 14.12 11.59 13.18 14.44 11.86
[0.82] [0.41] [0.72] [0.94] [0.91]
MFIs 13.84 12.04 12.72 12.75 11.86
[1.32] [1.86] [1.02] [2.21] [1.50]
LFIs 15.21 11.23 13.18 15.44 11.48
[1.26] [0.58] [1.12] [0.94] [1.29]
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. MFI (LFI) stands for More (Less) Financially Integrated
countries.M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones
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growth is highest on average for industrial countries, followed by MFI economies
and then the LFI economies. The order is reversed for output volatility. Thus, at a
very coarse level, one can already discern a negative cross-sectional relationship
between growth and volatility.
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2005) show that this is confirmed by a cross-
sectional plot of growth against volatility. In effect, this is the updated version
of the basic RR result. The relationship is, however, different across the three groups
of countries. Like RR, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2005) find a positive relationship
between growth and volatility among industrial countries and a negative one among
developing countries. But the relationship also differs among the developing coun-
tries. While it is strongly negative for LFI economies, it is positive among the group
of MFI economies. These results suggest the need to clearly discriminate among
these different groups of countries in further analysis.
Next, we provide some basic stylized facts from a time-series perspective. An
examination of changes in patterns of macroeconomic volatility over time (Table 1,
columns 2–5) shows that average output growth and volatility have both declined
in industrialized countries over the 1980s and 1990s.7 Both MFI and LFI economies
saw a decline in their average output growth rates in the 1980s and a subsequent
rebound in the 1990s, although growth remained below the corresponding levels in
the 1970s. The evolution of volatility is less similar across these two groups, with
MFI economies experiencing a small increase in volatility in the 1980s, while LFI
economies had a significant decline in volatility in each of the past two decades.
From this broad perspective, it is difficult to detect a stable time-series relationship
between growth and volatility that is consistent across different country groups.
The results for the levels and volatility of consumption growth, reported in the
second panel of Table 1, show a similar pattern in the sense that industrialized coun-
tries have the highest average consumption growth rate, followed by MFI and LFI
economies; for the volatility of consumption growth, the order is reversed. However,
while both industrialized and LFI economies experience a decline in the volatility of
consumption growth in the 1990s, MFI economies show no such improvement. This
suggests that MFI economies do not appear to benefit from financial integration in
terms of being able to use international capital markets to better share their income
risk and smooth growth of consumption.8
The results for investment are also different from those for output in some
respects. For example, one key difference is that average investment growth for
industrial economies picks up significantly in the 1980s, after dipping sharply in
the 1970s, and then settles back slightly in the 1990s. For both groups of devel-
oping economies, average investment growth slows markedly in the 1980s before
rebounding in the 1990s. Interestingly, while the volatility of investment growth
declines slightly in the 1980s and 1990s for both industrial and LFI economies, it
rises gradually but noticeably for the MFI economies.
7The steady decline in the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates in industrialized countries since the
1970s has been documented extensively (see, for example, Stock and Watson, 2002).
8See Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003b) for a more detailed analysis of this issue.GROWTH AND VOLATILITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
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In the cases of exports and imports, the basic growth-volatility relationship is
preserved over the full sample period across the three groups of countries. On aver-
age, industrial countries display the highest level of growth and lowest volatility,
with MFI and LFI economies following in the usual order. However, the patterns
of growth and volatility across decades again reveal some differences. During the
1990s, MFI economies become the group with the highest levels and volatility of
import growth rates. Again, the relationship between growth and volatility of these
macroeconomic variables has been changing over time even within country groups,
implying that no clear pattern emerges from this analysis.9
Growth and Volatility Before and After Liberalizations
A different approach to exploring the effects of globalization on the growth-
volatility relationship is to examine if this relationship has shifted during the period
of globalization. As a first cut, we split the sample into two periods—1960–85 and
1986–2000. We picked this break point because, as noted earlier, capital flows
across industrial countries as well as between industrial and developing countries
surged dramatically starting in the mid-1980s. The results did not show a sharp shift
in the relationship across the two periods. For industrial economies, the relationship
looks strongly positive in both periods. For developing economies, it appears to
become more strongly negative in the second period. One potential problem with
this approach is that because trade and financial liberalization occurred at different
times, especially among the developing economies, the choice of an identical break
point in the sample for all countries could influence the results.
To overcome this problem, we turn our attention to the group of MFI economies,
which faced the most dramatic shifts in openness to trade and financial flows during
the past 20 years. Figures 1a–1b (taken from Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2005)
show the relationship for this group of economies before and after trade and finan-
cial liberalization, respectively. The results indicate a major change in the growth-
volatility relationship after liberalizations. For example, the relationship is strongly
negative in the period before trade liberalization and positive after that. The differ-
ence between the pre- and postfinancial liberalizations periods follows a similar but
somewhat less striking pattern. These plots suggest that trade and financial integra-
tion might have a considerable effect on how volatility and growth are associated.
To explore this finding further, we conduct an event study analysis for the MFI
economies and examine the dynamics of growth and volatility before and after the
different measures of liberalization. Table 2 presents the cross-sectional mean and
median values of average levels and volatility of growth for the MFI sample before
and after trade and financial liberalizations. There is a sharp increase in the average
9To examine whether the results discussed above could be distorted by the use of decade averages, we
plotted the growth and volatility of each variable for different groups of countries using 10-year rolling
windows for both the growth and volatility measures. The qualitative features of the results in Table 1 were
generally preserved, indicating that the use of decade averages is not driving or distorting either the cross-
sectional or time-series results.M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones
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growth rates of output and its components after trade liberalizations. Financial lib-
eralizations are also associated, on average, with improvements in the growth per-
formance of the MFI economies. Figures 2a–2b show that these results are not just
driven by a small set of countries. For most of the countries in our sample, average
growth rates of output increase after trade liberalization. The results are similar, but
weaker, for financial liberalization. The lower panel of Table 2 indicates that there
is only a modest reduction in the average volatility of output growth after trade or
financial liberalizations, a result that is echoed by the country-specific results in
Figures 3a–3b. Table 2 also shows that a similar result holds for the volatility of
consumption growth. Interestingly, however, the volatility of the growth rates of
the other components of output do appear to decline significantly after trade liberal-
izations, although the picture is much more mixed in pre- and postfinancial liber-
alization comparisons.
We now turn to a more detailed study of the time profiles of growth and volatil-
ity in MFI economies before and after liberalizations. We first compute the level and
standard deviation of average growth rates of output, consumption, investment,



































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations. MFI stands for More Financially Integrated countries.
Figure 1. Growth and Volatility in MFI Countries
(Simple correlation, before and after liberalizations)43
then examine the behavior of sample median volatility and growth over this window
before and after the liberalization dates.
Figure 4a displays the evolutions of the cross-sectional medians of average
growth rates of output and its components for eight years before and eight years after
a trade liberalization event. It appears that trade liberalizations often take place
around the time of an economic slowdown and are, in general, followed by a sub-
stantial expansion in economic activity in the succeeding eight-year period. Changes
in the growth rate of consumption closely follow those in output. After trade liber-
alization, investment growth on average rises more than output growth, implying a
substantial increase in the rate of investment (investment/output). On average, the
Source: Authors’ calculations. 



































































































































































































Figure 2. Output Growth: Before and After Liberalizations








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terronesgrowth rates of imports and exports also register noticeable increases following
trade liberalization. Figure 4b shows the median growth rates before and after finan-
cial liberalizations. Financial liberalizations are also associated with a pickup in out-
put growth, but the increase in the cross-sectional average of output growth rates is
smaller than in the case of trade liberalizations. After financial liberalizations, there
is typically also a substantial increase in the growth rates of investment and imports.
How can we explain the V-shaped behavior of the growth performance of MFI
economies around liberalization episodes? First, many of the liberalization programs
were probably undertaken following an economic slowdown or crisis. Indeed,
Tornell (1998) argues that economic reforms generally take place in the aftermath of
Source: Authors’ calculations. 



























































































































































































Figure 3. Output Volatility: Before and After Liberalizations
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GROWTH AND VOLATILITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATIONeconomic and/or political crises and documents that between 1970 and 1995, almost
60 percent of trade liberalizations were implemented during periods of economic
turmoil. Second, implementation of liberalization programs could signal a change in
the nature of economic policies, which in turn leads to increased credibility. In the
case of financial liberalizations, this probably increases both foreign financial flows
and domestic investment, which results in an increase in economic growth. In the
case of trade liberalizations, there could be an increase in domestic investment growth
because of the fall in the cost of foreign capital goods and intermediate inputs. The
export sector would also be expected to expand faster following trade liberaliza-
tion, owing to increased access to foreign markets. Both of these could boost output
growth in the aftermath of trade liberalization programs.
Figures 5a–5b show how the cross-sectional medians of the volatility of the
growth rates of output and its components evolve before and after trade and finan-
cial liberalizations, respectively. Neither type of liberalization leads to a decisive
change in the volatility of output and consumption growth. However, growth rates
of investment, exports, and imports do appear to become somewhat less volatile
after trade and financial liberalizations.
Some of these results are consistent with other findings in the literature. For
example, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) document that trade liberalizations are asso-
M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: 0 (zero) indicates the year of liberalization. In each panel, the sample median of eight-year rolling window of the 
average growth rate of respective variable is plotted. 
b. Financial Liberalization 























































































Figure 4. Growth: Before and After Liberalizations
(8-year rolling windows)ciated with increases in the average growth rate of output and the investment rate.
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) find that equity market liberalizations on
average produce a 1 percent increase in the growth rate of output over a five-year
period and lead to an increase in the investment rate. However, in the case of the
impact of financial liberalizations on volatility, our results are somewhat different
from those of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002), who employ a larger sample
of countries than in our data set. They find that after equity market liberalizations,
there is generally a significant decrease in the volatility of output and consumption
growth.
A Regional Case Study: Growth and Volatility in Sub-Saharan Africa
In previous sections, we documented a negative relationship between growth and
volatility in developing countries. In addition, recent research concludes that output
volatility could have a negative impact on poverty. Among the poorest regions of the
world, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has always been a stark example of the negative
relationship between volatility and growth and the adverse effects of volatility on
poverty and welfare. The average growth rate of output in the region has been the
GROWTH AND VOLATILITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
47
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: 0 (zero) indicates the year of liberalization. In each panel, the sample median of the eight-year rolling window of 
the standard deviation of the average growth rate of the respective variable is plotted.














































































Figure 5. Volatility: Before and After Liberalizations
(8-year rolling windows)slowest of any region over the past three decades, while its volatility has been the
highest. This section briefly analyzes the relationship between growth and volatility
in SSA.10
Figure 6a shows the negative relationship between volatility and growth in
sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1970–2004. The countries in SSA, in addition
to being poor, share several other features that further magnify the negative effects
of volatility on growth. In particular, the strength and composition of economic link-
ages with the global economy play a major role in explaining the negative relation-
ship between volatility and growth in the region. For example, SSA’s trade linkages
with the global economy remain relatively weak, limiting the region’s ability to cope
with the adverse impact of volatility on growth. Despite recent improvements in the
region as a whole, the trade policy regimes of several countries in SSA are highly
restrictive, reflecting the presence of high and dispersed tariffs and widespread use
of nontariff barriers.
Sub-Saharan African trade linkages with the global economy are weak in some
respects when compared, for instance, with the emerging market countries in Asia.
(Figure 6b). As we show using various regression models in the next section, weak
trade linkages could be one of the major factors driving the negative associa-
tion between volatility and growth in the region. Moreover, sub-Saharan African
economies depend on a narrow range of commodities for their export earnings. In
particular, primary goods constitute close to 90 percent of total exports in these coun-
tries, which is more than double that in emerging Asia. Mainly because of this, terms-
of-trade fluctuations are very volatile in the sub-Saharan African countries, adversely
affecting growth. Consistent with the stylized facts we documented earlier, the aver-
age growth is much higher in emerging Asian countries than in sub-Saharan Africa,
while volatility in emerging Asia is roughly half of that in the SSAregion (Figure 6c).
III. Regression Analysis
This section turns to a more formal empirical analysis of the growth-volatility rela-
tionship. We first reexamine the validity of the basic RR results in our longer (and
slightly different) sample covering the period 1960–2000. Next, we analyze the
impact of globalization on this relationship by interacting volatility with the measures
of economic integration in our regressions. We also provide a brief discussion of how
different types of financial flows could affect the growth-volatility relationship. We
then turn our attention to the effects of volatility stemming from different components
of demand on this relationship. Finally, we examine the impact of numerous addi-
tional control variables and conduct some robustness tests of our main results.
The Basic Relationship Between Growth and Volatility
The first regression that RR report in their paper is a cross-sectional bivariate regres-
sion of mean output growth on its standard deviation for a 92-country sample
M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones
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10Some of the material in this subsection is drawn from research conducted by two of the authors of
this paper for the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (see Kose and Terrones, 2005).49
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: In each figure, volatility refers to the standard deviation of growth rates of per capita 
values. All other statistics are averages of respective variables over the comparable periods.  
Figure 6. Growth and Volatility: A Regional Perspectiveover the period 1962–85. They report that the coefficient on output volatility is
significantly negative. We run a similar cross-sectional regression of output growth,
measured as the average growth rate of per capita GDP, on volatility, measured as
the standard deviation of output growth. We reestimate this basic RR regression for
our sample of 85 countries over the period 1960–2000. As shown in Table 3, we get
a statistically significant coefficient of −0.23 (column 1), which is close to the one
reported in RR, confirming that their basic result is preserved in our sample.
Does the relationship remain valid for different country groups? As column 2
shows, a similar regression based on our subsample of 21 industrial countries yields
a significantly positive coefficient of 0.42. RR find that in their sample of 24 OECD
economies, the coefficient on volatility is positive but not significantly different
from zero. One potential explanation of the difference between these two results is
that the positive association between volatility and economic growth among indus-
trial countries has become stronger over time. Other reasons could be the difference
in sample coverage (21 industrial countries in ours versus 24 in theirs) and data
revisions in the Penn World Tables.
We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between growth and
volatility for the developing country subsample (column 3). We then analyze how
the growth-volatility relationship differs across industrial, MFI, and LFI countries.
To do this, we interact volatility with dummies for the three groups of countries.
M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones
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Table 3. Growth and Volatility: Cross-Section Regressions
Full Industrial  Developing  Full  Sample: 
Sample Countries Countries with interaction terms
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Volatility −0.228 0.420 −0.182
[0.076]*** [0.210]* [0.094]*
Volatility × Industrial 0.363
[0.162]**
Volatility × MFI 0.239
[0.146]
Volatility × LFI −0.112
[0.074]
Number of observations 85 21 64 85
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.32
Is the volatility coefficient equal across country groups? (P-values)
H0: Industrial = MFI 0.257
H0: Industrial = LFI 0.000
H0: MFI = LFI 0.001
H0: Industrial = MFI = LFI 0.000
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. Industrial, MFI, and LFI
denote country group dummy variables. MFI (LFI) stands for More (Less) Financially Integrated
countries. Robust significance standard errors are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, and ***
indicate statistical at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All regressions
include an intercept.GROWTH AND VOLATILITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
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We again find a statistically significant positive relationship between volatility
and growth for industrial countries (column 4). The results suggest that there is
a weak positive association between volatility and growth (borderline signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level) for MFI economies, whereas it is negative (but not
statistically significant) for LFI countries. In addition, the coefficient associated
with LFI economies appears to be significantly different from those of other groups
of economies.
Three main findings from this exercise stand out. First, the unconditional neg-
ative cross-sectional relationship between growth and volatility documented by RR
is preserved in our sample. Second, the basic relationship is sensitive to the choice
of country groups. In particular, the results indicate that while there is a significant
positive relationship for industrial countries, the relationship is significantly nega-
tive for developing countries. Third, the association between growth and volatility
appears to differ across the groups of MFI and LFI economies. The latter two results
suggest that levels of trade and financial integration might have an influence on the
growth-volatility relationship.
However, these bivariate regressions set aside the issue of additional controls
that could explain growth. To address this issue, we follow the RR study and include
a set of standard controls commonly used in the growth literature, including the
log level of initial per capita income, the fraction of the population with at least
a primary education, the share of investment in GDP, and the average population
growth rate. We present the results of regressions with additional controls in
Table 4 (column 2). The results indicate that these additional controls are statis-
tically significant with their expected signs. The education variable has a signif-
icantly positive impact on growth, and initial per capita income has a significant
and negative impact (which has been interpreted as evidence of conditional con-
vergence). More importantly, the nature of the relationship between growth and
volatility is not affected by the inclusion of the growth controls. In particular,
while the coefficient on volatility becomes smaller, it retains its statistical sig-
nificance.11 We then estimate the regressions using the industrial and developing
country subsamples (columns 3 and 4). The results are broadly consistent with
those from the full sample. Interestingly, for the industrial country subsample, the
coefficient on volatility is almost the same as that in the RR regression (−0.385 in
RR and −0.379 in ours; both are statistically significant).
These findings indicate that the growth-volatility relationship documented by
RR persisted into the 1990s. However, the unconditional correlations in Table 3
also suggest that there could be a nonlinear relationship between growth and
volatility, since the correlation is negative for developing countries and positive for
industrial countries. To further analyze the nature of this nonlinearity, we now
examine directly the roles of trade and financial linkages.
11These results are consistent with the findings in Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005), but they differ from
those in Fatás and Mihov (2003). The latter study reports that while the unconditional growth-volatility
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Understanding the Role of Globalization
We now analyze how different aspects of globalization affect the growth-volatility
relationship by introducing various measures of integration into the cross-section
regression. Interestingly, when we introduce measures of trade and financial inte-
gration, the coefficient on volatility remains negative and statistically significant
(Table 4, column 5). The coefficients on both trade integration variables are statisti-
cally significant and positive, indicating that trade integration has a positive impact
on economic growth even after controlling for the effect of volatility. However, the
coefficient on the financial openness variable is negative. As noted in Section I, sev-
eral papers suggest that there is no robust correlation between financial integration
and economic growth, and, in some of these, the coefficient on financial openness
has a negative sign, similar to the result reported here.
We then interact volatility with the integration variables to examine if the rela-
tionship between growth and volatility is linked to the degree of integration. When
we interact the volatility variable with measures of integration, we always use con-
tinuous rather than discrete measures of the latter. These continuous measures
capture variations over time in the degree of trade and financial integration better
than the binary ones, as they more accurately reflect the changes in annual trade
and financial flows.
Column 6 of Table 4 shows that the interaction between volatility and trade inte-
gration is significantly positive. The coefficient on volatility is also significant and
negative. The positive interaction term indicates that the greater the degree of trade
integration, the weaker the negative relationship between volatility and growth. In
other words, for a given level of volatility, economies with a higher degree of trade
integration appear to suffer smaller negative effects on growth than those with a
lower degree of trade integration. Column 7 reports results for the measures of finan-
cial integration. The basic relationship between growth and volatility disappears,
and only the binary measure of trade integration has a positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient.
We now turn our attention to the roles played by trade and financial integration
together to get a better grasp of how different aspects of globalization affect the
relationship between growth and volatility. When we include both the trade and
financial interaction terms, the positive coefficient on the interaction with trade
integration stays statistically significant, while the coefficient on the financial inte-
gration interaction term turns negative and significant (column 8). Thus, once trade
integration is accounted for, financial integration appears to have a negative impact
on the growth-volatility relationship. This result is similar and could be related to
the sign of the coefficient on the financial integration variable in column 3.
One interpretation of these results is that higher trade openness brings with it
benefits in terms of higher growth even though it may also expose an economy to
more volatility arising from external shocks. This is consistent with a large body of
literature showing that trade integration is good for growth (Baldwin, 2003; Berg
and Krueger, 2003; and Winters, 2004) but is typically associated with higher
volatility (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2003a). What are the mechanisms through
which openness to trade could mitigate the adverse impact of volatility on growth?12Kose, Meredith, and Towe (2005) analyze the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement
on the dynamics of volatility and growth in Mexico and argue that trade integration has made the Mexican
economy more resilient to shocks and may have contributed to Mexico’s faster recovery from the 1994–95
peso crisis than from the 1982 debt crisis.
13Non-FDI flows could include official flows. However, in our data set, it is difficult to distinguish
between official grants/loans and other types of non-FDI flows. Hence, the results below using non-FDI
flows should be interpreted with some caution.
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While our present paper does not attempt to address this question, recent research
suggests several possible mechanisms. For example, trade integration could help a
developing economy export its way out of a recession, since a given exchange rate
depreciation could have a larger impact on its export revenues than in an economy
with weaker trade linkages. Stronger export revenues could also help service exter-
nal debt, which is quite substantial in a number of developing countries (see Catão,
2002). These factors also suggest that openness to trade flows could make devel-
oping countries less vulnerable to sudden stops of international capital flows (see
Cavallo and Frankel, 2004).12
Could the results for the financial openness variable be driven by highly volatile
portfolio flows? As discussed in Section I, some studies find that different types of
financial flows may have different effects on economic performance. In particular,
these studies consistently indicate that FDI flows tend to be positively associated
with economic growth. While other forms of capital inflows could also have a pos-
itive association with economic growth, their impact tends to be smaller and less
robust (Prasad and others, 2003; Reisen and Soto, 2001). Another important feature
that has been documented in the literature is that different types of capital flows dif-
fer substantially in terms of their volatility. For example, FDI flows constitute the
least volatile category of financial flows to developing countries, which is not sur-
prising given their long-term and relatively fixed nature. Portfolio flows tend to be
far more volatile and prone to abrupt reversals (Wei, 2001).
To further analyze the impact of financial integration on the growth-volatility
relationship, we now compare the impacts of different types of financial flows. We
focus on two broad categories: FDI flows and all other categories of flows, includ-
ing portfolio flows and bank lending.13 The first panel of Table 5 shows the results
of cross-section regressions when volatility is interacted with financial integration,
now measured by the ratio of gross flows of FDI to GDP. The coefficients associated
with the interaction terms suggest that FDI flows have a significant and positive
impact on the relationship between growth and volatility (columns 1, 2, and 3).
When both interaction terms are employed, the coefficient on the trade openness
interaction, while still positive, turns insignificant (column 4). Interestingly, the inter-
action term on financial integration becomes positive and significant, suggesting
that FDI flows could dampen the adverse impact of volatility on economic growth.
When volatility is interacted with the other financial integration measure, which
is based on gross non-FDI capital inflows and outflows as a ratio to GDP, the inter-
action term on financial integration again turns negative (columns 5–7). Moreover,
when the trade openness interaction is included, the interaction coefficient associ-
ated with financial integration becomes significantly negative (column 8). The inter-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5514Aizenman and Marion (1999) find a negative correlation between aggregate volatility and private
investment in developing countries. RR find little evidence in support of theories that attribute the nega-
tive link between volatility and economic growth to investment dynamics. Balassa (1978), Feder (1983),
Moran (1983), and Basu and McLeod (1992) examine the relationship between export instability and eco-
nomic growth.
15We also examined the roles played by the volatility of the growth rates of exports and imports. Those
results are not reported here, since those two components of GDP do not appear to be important in driv-
ing the growth-volatility relationship.
16For example, investment plays a critical role in transmitting the negative impact of volatility to growth
in Africa. While sub-Saharan Africa’s low rate of investment has always been a major impediment to eco-
nomic growth, the high volatility of investment in the region has been particularly damaging (see Fischer,
Hernández-Catá, and Khan, 1998). The average growth rate of investment in sub-Saharan Africa has been
the slowest of any region over the past three decades, while its volatility has been the highest. Sub-Saharan
African countries also suffer from the detrimental effects of highly volatile and procyclical fiscal policies on
economic growth. Government revenues in sub-Saharan Africa are dependent on extremely volatile com-
modity exports, which results in large fluctuations in these revenues (Dehn, Gilbert, and Varangis, 2005).
Recent research shows that highly volatile and procyclical fiscal policies often lead to an increase in the
amplitude of macroeconomic fluctuations and lower economic growth (Fatás and Mihov, 2003).
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significant. These findings suggest that portfolio and other flows, which are relatively
more volatile than FDI flows, tend to intensify the negative relationship between
volatility and growth, while trade openness appears to weaken it.
Roles Played by Different Components of Aggregate Demand
Section I discussed the potential roles played by various components of demand
and different types of shocks in linking the volatility of output to economic growth.
We now examine how the volatility of the growth rates of different components of
demand affect the growth rate of output. This could help explain the nature of the
relationship between the amplitude of macroeconomic fluctuations and economic
growth as emphasized by some studies. For example, some theoretical models argue
that the link between growth and volatility depends on the dynamics of investment.
Bernanke (1983) and Aizenman and Marion (1993) construct models in which
irreversibilities and/or the presence of asymmetric adjustment costs in investment
could lead to higher volatility and lower investment, which in turn reduces eco-
nomic growth.14
To shed light on this issue, we regress the growth rate of output on the volatil-
ity of each demand component within the same regression framework used so far. In
particular, we focus on the roles played by consumption, investment, and government
expenditure.15 The results in Table 6 show that the unconditional correlation between
growth and volatility remains significantly negative when we include the volatility of
the demand components except for government expenditures (columns 1, 4, and 7).
We then reestimate the same relationship after introducing additional growth controls
(columns 2, 5, and 8). There is a significant and negative relationship between output
growth and the volatility of each demand component, indicating the importance of
each of these components in accounting for the overall negative relationship between
growth and volatility.16
Next, we analyze how globalization affects the growth-volatility relationship by
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tion in our regressions (columns 3, 6, and 9). Our results are broadly consistent with
the benchmark findings reported in Table 4. For all three demand components, trade
integration appears to weaken the negative relationship between growth and volatil-
ity, but the interaction term on trade integration is statistically significant only for the
volatility of consumption growth. There are a couple of possible reasons why the
results with consumption are most similar to our benchmark findings. First, con-
sumption fluctuations could be better at tracking the fluctuations in output simply
because consumption is the largest component of output in most of the countries in
our sample. Moreover, among the components of domestic demand, the growth rate
of consumption has the highest correlation with output growth. In the case of the
financial integration variable, the results indicate that the interaction term is again
negative, but not statistically significant, in all of these specifications.
Robustness Tests
We conducted a variety of robustness tests of our main results. To conserve space,
we only summarize our main findings here.17 We took the benchmark specification
(Table 4, column 8) and added a number of additional controls (one per regression—
we did not include all of these additional controls simultaneously). These additional
controls included measures of financial development (ratios of broad money and pri-
vate sector credit to GDP), real exchange rate overvaluation, the composition of out-
put (share of the agricultural sector in GDP), indicators of institutional quality, and
the skewness of output growth (one way of capturing the effects of large episodes of
volatility on the growth-volatility relationship). We also checked the sensitivity of
our results to alternative regression frameworks. To address the concern that the key
results could be driven by outliers, we reestimated the benchmark specification
using a least-absolute deviation regression.18
In virtually all of these specifications, the negative coefficient on volatility and
the positive coefficients on the trade integration and volatility*trade integration
interaction variables were preserved. The coefficients on financial integration and
volatility*financial integration proved to be somewhat fragile, however, losing their
statistical significance in a few of the specifications. In short, many of the key results
of our paper—especially those related to trade integration—are reasonably robust.
In particular, the role of trade integration in dampening the negative association
between growth and volatility is significant across all these robustness experiments.
IV. Conclusions
This paper has provided a comprehensive examination of the relationship between
growth and volatility. We first documented the basic stylized facts about the evolu-
tion of the growth and volatility relationship over time and across countries. The
17Tables with detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
18Another potential concern is endogeneity of the trade and financial integration variables. This is a
much bigger concern for panel data estimation. In our earlier paper (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2005),
where we use growth and volatility measures over 10-year periods and conduct panel estimation, we run
instrumental variables regressions to address this problem explicitly.results indicate that this relationship has been changing over time and across differ-
ent country groups in response to increased trade and financial flows. In particular,
evidence suggests that the nature of this relationship differs even among developing
countries, depending on the level of their integration into the global economy. Results
from the event-study analysis suggest that there tends to be a major shift in the
growth-volatility relationship after trade and financial liberalizations. For example,
among MFI economies, the relationship is strongly negative in the period before
trade liberalizations and positive after that. The difference between the pre- and post-
financial liberalizations periods follows a similar but less definitive pattern. These
findings suggest that trade and financial integration could have a considerable effect
on the association between volatility and growth.
We then provided a more formal analysis of the relationship between growth
and volatility using various cross-section regression models. Several interesting
results from this analysis stand out. First, when we include the data for the 1990s,
the negative relationship between volatility and growth appears to survive, but with
some important qualifications. Trade integration seems to attenuate the negative
growth-volatility relationship, as the estimated coefficients on interactions between
volatility and trade integration are significantly positive. This suggests that countries
that are more open to trade flows could face a less severe trade-off between growth
and volatility. Financial integration, however, seems to strengthen the negative rela-
tionship between growth and volatility.
We then examined whether the latter finding could be driven by highly volatile
portfolio flows. Our results indicate that portfolio and other capital flows, which
are relatively more volatile than FDI flows, do intensify the negative relationship,
while FDI flows dampen the adverse impact of volatility on economic growth.
We also found that volatility stemming from various components of aggregate
demand—including consumption, investment, and government expenditure—is
negatively associated with overall economic growth.
Does the result about the role of financial integration imply that the adverse
impact of macroeconomic volatility on growth is further exacerbated in more finan-
cially integrated economies? Such a strong conclusion may not be warranted simply
on the basis of the cross-section regressions presented in this paper, which do not uti-
lize the marked variation over time in the measures of integration. As briefly docu-
mented above, trade linkages have increased substantially over the past four decades.
Moreover, these changes over time are particularly important in the context of finan-
cial integration, which has risen greatly since the mid-1980s. In our earlier paper
(Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2005), we provided a panel regression analysis of the
relationship between volatility and growth that is aimed at capturing the effects of
the significant changes over time in the volume of trade and financial flows. That
analysis indicates that both trade and financial integration attenuate the negative
growth-volatility relationship. This finding suggests that it is necessary to consider
the temporal patterns as well as cross-sectional changes in the dynamics of financial
flows in order to account for the impact of financial integration on the relationship
between volatility and growth. While the results for trade integration are very similar
to those reported here, our earlier paper also documents that the results for the inter-
action of financial integration with volatility are smaller and less robust in terms
of statistical significance across different specifications.
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The finding that FDI flows may have different effects than the other types of
capital flows is intriguing. However, before drawing any firm conclusions, a deeper
analysis of this issue is warranted. In future work, we also plan to examine how cap-
ital account openness and domestic financial sector liberalization jointly affect an
economy’s growth rate and exposure to macroeconomic volatility.
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